The government’s plan to collapse Uganda’s unbundled power sector back into a single monopoly under the Rationalisation of Agencies and Public Expenditure (RAPEX) programme is a high-stakes structural gamble. By reversing 25 years of institutional separation to merge UEDCL, UEGCL, and UETCL, the state is resurrecting the ghost of the defunct Uganda Electricity Board (UEB)—a monopoly notorious for chronic inefficiencies, deep-seated corruption, and dismal service delivery.
While the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development promises reduced administrative costs and streamlined operations, history suggests that centralizing power generation, transmission, and distribution under one massive bureaucratic umbrella rarely benefits the end consumer.
True efficiency is driven by transparency and robust regulation, not by creating an unaccountable state monopoly. The government cannot afford to take this leap blindly.
Before the switch is flipped, the government must answer to the public.The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, led by Dr. Monica Musenero, must immediately release the full implementation timetable and structural frameworks. The public deserves to see the math proving this merger will actually cut costs.
Parliament and the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) must establish ironclad, legally binding safeguards. We demand a transparent accounting system ensuring that operational failures or financial deficits of a single consolidated mega-utility are not hidden behind closed corporate doors and quietly offloaded onto consumer electricity bills.

The state must explicitly guarantee that ongoing grid investments will not be derailed. UEDCL’s vital $994 million grid modernization plan cannot be sacrificed to bureaucratic reshuffling while businesses continue to suffer local power outages.
The massive consolidation of these three distinct corporate entities presents severe structural and operational trade-offs that threaten the stability of our entire energy grid:
The Accountability Vacuum: In the current unbundled system, it is easy to point fingers at exactly where the grid is failing—whether it’s a generation shortfall (UEGCL), a transmission line fault (UETCL), or local distribution failure (UEDCL). A merged entity swallows these distinctions, making it incredibly difficult for the public and regulators to hold specific departments accountable for poor service.
Masked Losses and Inflated Tariffs: Reverting to a vertically integrated utility removes the checks and balances that came with institutional separation. When one state mega-entity controls everything from the dam to the domestic meter, internal inefficiencies or multi-million-dollar project cost overruns in generation or transmission can easily be socialized and passed down to consumers through inflated retail tariffs.
The “Too Big to Fail” Trap: Instead of eliminating duplication, a single massive parastatal often creates top-heavy bureaucratic bottlenecks. Decision-making could slow to a crawl, stalling emergency responses to blackouts and delaying critical localized distribution fixes.
Contractual and Structural Chaos: Merging three distinct corporate entities means rewriting legal frameworks, renegotiating ongoing procurement contracts, and merging entirely different institutional cultures. For a sector already plagued by persistent power outages, this structural upheaval could trigger operational paralysis mid-stream.

Vulnerability to Political Patronage: Historically, giant state-owned monopolies in Uganda have been deeply vulnerable to political interference, bloated staffing based on patronage rather than merit, and financial mismanagement.
The government frames this merger as a cost-cutting measure to lower prices, but economic realities suggest that centralizing a utility can just as easily drive industrial tariffs upward.
Eliminating three separate boards of directors, redundant executive suites, and overlapping administrative departments will lower the sector’s operational expenditure.
A vertically integrated model eliminates the internal bulk supply tariff friction where UETCL buys power from generation companies and sells it to the distributor at a markup.
A single state-owned entity is easier for the government to financially manipulate or subsidize directly to support local manufacturing.Even within state ownership, unbundled companies currently operate under distinct performance contracts set by the ERA. Merging them risks diluting these metrics, tanking operational efficiency, and driving prices up.
The power sector relies heavily on external financing. International lenders view giant, state-run monopolies as higher risk due to historical vulnerabilities to political mismanagement. Higher perceived risk means higher interest rates on loans—an expense ultimately paid by commercial power bills.
Analyzing how our East African neighbors manage their electricity sectors provides a cautionary blueprint. While Kenya operates on a partially unbundled model with heavy private sector participation (KPLC), Tanzania relies on a single, vertically integrated state utility (TANESCO)—the exact model Uganda is now rushing toward.
Historically, single-utility systems like Tanzania’s have struggled with severe generation shortfalls and routine blackouts due to a lack of internal commercial pressure, despite heavy state subsidies. Conversely, partially unbundled models face intense scrutiny over pass-through costs but maintain clear division of liabilities. Uganda currently enjoys a competitive business tariff advantage over Kenya; throwing our power sector into organizational chaos risks erasing that edge.
For Ugandan businesses, the actual price per kilowatt-hour is only half the equation. The hidden tariff is the cost of unserved energy—the money lost running diesel generators or pausing production lines during blackouts. If this organizational upheaval stalls infrastructure rehabilitation, businesses face a catastrophic double blow: unpredictable tariff structures paired with deteriorating power quality.
A skilled workforce cannot fix a flawed structural design. While UEDCL has technically astute Ugandan professionals capable of running the distribution network, forcing them into a flawed, regressive corporate structure will yield the same old results.
If the government rushes this merger simply as a cost-cutting checkbox under RAPEX without clear, transparent safeguards and public accountability, electricity consumers will pay the ultimate price. We demand transparency, clear legislative boundaries, and an ironclad commitment to service delivery before the power sector is rolled back into the past.
